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Abstract 
 
Network Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDS) are computer systems which monitor a network with the 
aim of discerning malicious from benign activity on that network. While a wide range of approaches 
have met varying levels of success, most IDSs rely on having access to a database of known attack 
signatures which are written by security experts.  Nowadays, in order to solve problems with false 
positive alerts, correlation algorithms are used to add additional structure to sequences of IDS alerts. 
However, such techniques are of no help in discovering novel attacks or variations of known attacks, 
something the human immune system (HIS) is capable of doing in its own specialised domain. This 
paper presents a novel immune algorithm for application to the IDS problem. The goal is to discover 
packets containing novel variations of attacks covered by an existing signature base. 
 
1 Introduction 
 
Network intrusion detection systems (NIDS) are usu- 
ally based on a fairly low level model of network traf- 
fic.  While this is good for performance it tends to 
produce results which make sense on a similarly low 
level which means that a fairly sophisticated knowl- 
edge of both networking technology and infiltration 
techniques is required to understand them. 
Intrusion alert correlation systems attempt to solve 
this problem by post-processing the alert stream from 
one or  many intrusion detection sensors (perhaps 
even heterogeneous ones).  The aim is to augment 
the somewhat one-dimensional alert stream with ad- 
ditional structure.  Such structural information clus- 
ters alerts in to scenarios sequences of low level alerts 
corresponding to a single logical threat. 
A common model for intrusion alert correlation al- 
gorithms is that of the attack graph. Attack graphas 
are directed acyclic graphs (DAGs) that attempt to 
represent the various types of alerts in terms of their 
prerequisites and consequences. Typically an attack 
graph is created by an expert from a priori informa- 
tion about attacks. The attack graph enables a corre- 
lation component to link a given alert with a previ- 
ous alert by tracking back to find alerts whose con- 
sequences imply the current alerts prerequisites. An- 
other feature is that if the correlation algorithm is run 
in reverse, predictions of future attacks can be ob- 
 
tained. 
In implementing basic correlation algorithms us- 
ing attack graphs, it was discovered that the output 
could be poor when the underlying IDS produced 
false negative alerts. This could cause scenarios to be 
split apart as evidence suggestive of a link between 
two scenarios is missing. This problem has been ad- 
dressed in various systems by adding the ability to 
hypothesise the existence of the missing alerts in cer- 
tain cases. Ning et al (2004) go as far as to use out of 
band data from a raw audit log of network traffic to 
help confirm or deny such hypotheses. 
While the meaning of correlated alerts and pre- 
dicted alerts is clear, hypothesisd results are less easy 
to interpret.  Presence of hypothesised alerts could 
mean more than just losing an alert, it could mean 
either of: 
 
1. The IDS missed the alert due to some noise, 
packet loss, or other low level sensor problem 
 
2. The IDS missed the alert because a novel varia- 
tion of a known attack was used 
 
3. The IDS missed the alert, because something not 
covered by the attack graph happened (totally 
new exploit, or new combination of known ex- 
ploits) 
 
This work is motivated specifically by the problem 
of finding novel variations of attacks.  In our case a 
 
 
variation is determined to be an attack which exploits 
the same vector as an attack detected by an existing 
rule. The basic approach is to apply AIS techniques 
to detect packets which contain such variations.  A 
correlation algorithm is taken advantage of to pro- 
vide additional safe/dangerous context signals to the 
AIS which would enable it to decide which packets 
to examine. The work aims to integrate a novel AIS 
component with existing intrusion detection and alert 
correlation systems in order to gain additional detec- 
tion capability. 
 
 
2 Intrusion Alert Correlation 
 
Although the exact implementation details of attack 
graphs algorithms vary, the basic correlation algo- 
rithm takes an alert and an output graph, and modifies 
the graph by addition of vertices and/or edges to pro- 
duce an updated output graph reflecting the current 
state of the monitored network system. 
For the purposes of discussion, an idealised form 
of correlation output will be defined which hides spe- 
cific details of the correlation algorithm from the AIS 
component.  This model, while fairly simple, ade- 
quately maps to current state of the art correlation 
algorithms.  Due to space constraints we do not de- 
scribe the full model here. 
 
 
3 Danger Theory 
 
The advent of Polly Matzingers Danger theory in has 
inspired a great deal of research in to the functioning 
of the innate immune system. A subsystem of the hu- 
man immune system (HIS) which is apparently able 
to distinguish between benign and pathogenic mate- 
rial within the organism and initiate an adaptive im- 
mune response. 
For this purpose our “libtissue” AIS framework, 
a product of a danger theory project (Aickelin et al, 
2003), will model a number of innate immune system 
components such as dendritic cells in order to direct 
an adaptive T-Cell based response. 
Dendritic cells (henceforth DCs) are of a class of 
cells in the immune system known as antigen present- 
ing cells. They differ from other cells in this class in 
that this is their sole discernable function.  As well 
as being able to absorb and present antigenic mate- 
rial DCs are also well adapted to detecting a set of 
endogenous and exogenous signals. These biological 
signals are abstracted in our system under the follow- 
ing designations: 
1. Safe: Indicates a safe context for developing tol- 
eration 
 
2. Danger:  Indicates a change in behaviour that 
could be considered pathological 
 
3. Pathogen Associated Molecular Pattern 
(PAMP): Known to be dangerous 
 
All of these environmental circumstances, or in- 
puts, are factors in the life cycle of the DC. A suf- 
ficient concentration of signals may trigger matura- 
tion along one of two differented pathways. One of 
which is associated with a reactive and the other with 
a tolerogenic T-cell response. 
In  the  proposed system,  DCs  are  seen  as  liv- 
ing among the IDS environment.  This is achieved 
by wiring up their environmental inputs to certain 
changes in the IDS output state. Populations of DCs 
are tied to the prediction vertices in the correlation 
graph, one DC for each predicted attack.   Packets 
matching the prediction criteria of such a vertex are 
injested by the corresponding DC. 
A prediction veretex can either be upgraded to an 
exploit vertex, changed to a hypothesised vertex, or 
be deleted depending on subsequent alerts.   These 
possibilities will result in either a PAMP, danger or 
safe signal respectively. 
These signals initiate maturation and consequent 
migration of the DC to a virtual lymph node where 
they are exposed to a population of T-cells generated 
using the IDSs signature base in much the same way 
as in a gene library.  This is combined with partial 
matching algorithms to find a T-cells to bind to the 
antigen being presented by the DC. 
Upon successful binding, the original packet corre- 
sponding to the culprit antigen is tagged and logged 
much like a normal alert. 
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